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Abstract 
Boards have an important role in ensuring that investors’ interests are protected. Our paper first 
examines whether the independence of a firm’s board affects information asymmetry among 
investors. We provide evidence that greater board independence leads to lower information 
asymmetry. Next, we provide evidence that more voluntary disclosure and greater analyst 
coverage are two underlying mechanisms via which greater board independence reduces 
information asymmetry. Of the two mechanisms, we find that analyst coverage is more 
significant in influencing how board independence affects information asymmetry. Overall, our 
paper contributes to a better understanding of the effect of board independence on information 
asymmetry. 
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1. Introduction 
We examine the effect of board independence on a firm’s information asymmetry among 
investors, and how this relationship is mediated by the firm’s information environment. Firms 
and their various stakeholders (e.g., shareholders and regulators) often have a common response 
to problems associated with the lack of transparency: they push for greater board independence. 
Such a response indicates an underlying belief that greater board independence would lead to an 
improvement in transparency. For example, in its 2002 annual report, General Electric (GE) 
states its rationale for having an independent board as follows: “At the core of corporate 
governance, of course, is the role of the board in overseeing how management serves the long-
term interests of share owners and other stakeholders. An active, informed, independent and 
involved board is essential for ensuring GE’s integrity, transparency and long-term strength.” 
Hence, an important empirical question is whether greater board independence indeed leads to an 
improvement in information asymmetry among investors. 
Our study is in line with a growing literature that examines how board independence 
affects a firm’s information environment and information asymmetry among investors (e.g., 
Klein, 2002; Anderson et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Petra 2007; Chung et al., 2010; 
Ferreira et al., 2011; Armstrong et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014). These studies generally 
document positive relations between the proportion of independent directors and accounting 
quality, earnings informativeness, timely loss recognition, and proxies for the firm’s information 
environment and asymmetry. However, Armstrong et al. (2014) note that this conclusion is 
premature because board independence can be endogenously determined by firm characteristics. 
For instance, studies have shown that firms with high information asymmetry choose to have 
relatively few independent directors (e.g., Linck et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 2009), raising concerns 
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of potential reverse causality. The authors then exploit regulations issued in 2003 by the NYSE 
and NASDAQ as an exogenous event that significantly altered the proportion of independent 
directors for some firms’ boards to observe whether and how these firms’ information 
environments change in response to this shock. They find that the information asymmetry 
component of the bid-ask spread decreases in response to an exogenous increase in the 
proportion of independent directors. In a similar vein, Chen et al. (2014) take advantage of the 
2003 NYSE and NASDAQ regulations to examine how board independence affects earnings 
management. These recent findings suggest the need for more research examining the (causal) 
relation between board independence and information asymmetry and the channels mediating 
this relation.  
We first examine whether greater board independence leads to lower information 
asymmetry, proxied by the probability of informed-based trading (PIN) and bid-ask spread. Our 
empirical results indicate that greater board independence leads to lower information asymmetry 
among investors based on these proxies. To identify the causal effect of board independence, we 
employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable approach and utilize two 
instruments — (1) the fraction of directors who also sit on at least one other firm’s board with 
above median proportion of independent directors during the year and (2) the proximity to a 
supply of independent directors, defined as the number of external directors located in the state 
where the firm’s headquarters is located in the year.1 In the 2SLS regression, we continue to find 
a negative relation between board independence and our proxies for information asymmetry. 
                                                 
1 The intuition for the first instrument is based on the concept of director social networks (Adams and Ferreria, 
2009). Briefly, when directors of a board sit on other boards with more independent directors, they know more 
independent directors whom they can persuade to join the board and/or are more open to having more independent 
directorships. The intuition for the second instrument is that when there are more external directors serving in firms 
in the nearby location, there is a greater supply of independent directors from which the firm can appoint its 
independent directors (Knyazeva et al. 2011). We discuss more about these instruments in Section 4.1.  
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Further diagnostic tests generally support the use of the 2SLS research design and the validity of 
board connections and board locations as good instruments for board independence. Overall, our 
results support the role of board independence in reducing information asymmetry among 
investors. 
In the second part of this study, we explore whether and to what extent firm’s information 
environment mediates the relation between board independence and information asymmetry 
among investors. This investigation is motivated by a stream of literature that argues that it is not 
only important to examine eventual outcomes; it is also important to understand the underlying 
mechanisms that results in those outcomes using techniques such as path analysis (e.g., Bushee 
and Noe, 2000; Barton and Mercer, 2005; Bhattacharya et al., 2012). For example, Bhattacharya 
et al. (2012) find both a direct path from earnings quality to the cost of equity, and an indirect 
path that is mediated by information asymmetry. As such, they validate information asymmetry 
as one mediator linking earnings quality to cost of capital, while still finding that earnings quality 
has a direct effect on cost of capital incremental to that via information asymmetry. 
In the case of board independence, the presence of more independent directors per se is 
unlikely to have only a direct effect on information asymmetry among investors; it is more likely 
that the change in board structure also affects the information environment, which, in turn, 
affects information asymmetry. Hence, to better understand the role of transparency in the 
relation between board independence and information asymmetry, we examine how the 
transparency associated with the firm’s information environment mediates the relation between 
board independence and information asymmetry among investors. In other words, we attempt to 
open up the “black box” linking board independence to information asymmetry. We focus on 
two sources of transparency relating to the firm’s information environment: (1) corporate 
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voluntary disclosure as proxied by management forecast frequency, and (2) information 
acquisition and dissemination by information intermediaries as proxied by analyst coverage. We 
argue that firms with higher management forecast frequency and analyst coverage are seen by 
investors as being more transparent. 
Our empirical results indicate that both corporate voluntary disclosure and information 
acquisition and dissemination by information intermediaries mediate the relation between board 
independence and information asymmetry. Specifically, we first document that greater board 
independence is associated with more frequent management forecasts and greater analyst 
coverage, which suggests that board independence leads to greater transparency in the firm’s 
information environment. We then find that greater board independence is still significantly 
associated with lower information asymmetry, when we include the information quality 
variables—voluntary disclosure and analyst coverage—as additional controls in our regressions. 
Our results are also robust to using an alternate measure of PIN based on the information 
component of PIN (Duarte and Young, 2009), and using two alternative approaches to deal with 
cross-correlation in the error terms. Overall, these results suggest that the board independence 
has both a direct effect on information asymmetry, as well as an indirect effect on information 
asymmetry through increased transparency in the information environment. 
In our investigation of how the information environment mediates the relation between 
board independence and information asymmetry among investors using path analysis, we find 
that analyst coverage is the more important mediating variable, compared to forecast frequency. 
Specifically, between 55.5 and 96.9 percent of the mediated path effect from board independence 
to information asymmetry is attributable to analyst coverage. Hence, the results suggest analysts 
are attracted to firms with a more independent board. Consequently, this significantly affects 
 5 
 
how board independence affects information asymmetry among investors, possibly because of 
the important role that analysts play as information intermediaries (Roulstone, 2003; Frankel and 
Li, 2004). 
We contribute to the extensive literature on board structure in several ways. First, we 
identify the causal effect of board independence on the firm’s information asymmetry. This 
identification is important because actions by regulators and firms are based on the belief that 
greater board independence can improve transparency. Prior studies that examine this issue 
suffer from significant endogeneity concerns; we propose an approach to mitigate these concerns 
based on an instrumental variable research design. Second, we attempt to shed light on the black 
box between board independence and information asymmetry among investors by showing that 
management forecast frequency and analyst coverage are important mediating mechanisms. We 
also provide a comparative analysis that measures the relative importance of each of these 
mediating variables in reducing the information asymmetry among investors.   
Our paper complements Armstrong et al. (2014) who also examine the effect of board 
independence on the firm’s information environment. There are two key differences between 
both papers. First, we rely on board networks and board locations as instruments to identify the 
effect of board independence, while they rely on the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ requirement of 
majority independent directors as an exogenous event shock. 2  Second, we examine the 
underlying mechanisms between board independence and information asymmetry, whereas they 
examine how this relation varies cross-sectionally with information processing costs. As 
                                                 
2 There are key differences between both approaches. First, the instrumental variable approach can typically be 
applied to any time period. In contrast, the use of an exogenous event shock, by construction, requires the empirical 
analyses to be at a single time point. Second, an exogenous event shock offers a cleaner identification to the extent 
that it satisfies the requirement that no other confounding events and that it causes a spike in board independence. 
Instrument variables often face significant validity threats due to imperfect exogeneity (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). 
Given the differences in the identification techniques, similar findings help strengthen the conclusion that more 
board independence leads to an improvement to the information environment.      
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discussed earlier, one objective of studying underlying mechanisms is to validate arguments 
relating two concepts such as board independence and information asymmetry among investors.  
The objective of examining how relations vary cross-sectionally is to understand the conditions 
(e.g., different information processing costs) under which certain relations are stronger/weaker.3 
Hence, both papers take different approaches to understand an important relation. 
The next section develops our conceptual framework linking board independence and 
information asymmetry. Section 3 describes the sample and empirical measures. Section 4 
discusses the test results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Framework linking board independence and information asymmetry 
2.1 The effect of board independence on the information asymmetry among investors  
More independent boards are more likely to act in the interests of investors, who typically 
demand greater transparency from the firms that they invest in. Independent directors have 
incentives to promote greater corporate disclosure to enhance shareholder value via increased 
stock liquidity and reduced cost of capital (e.g., Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005). 4  Furthermore, in order to better fulfill their fiduciary duties toward shareholders, 
independent directors seek better and more information to aid their monitoring activities and thus 
have the incentive to increase the transparency of the information environment by encouraging 
greater disclosure made by corporate managers (e.g., Linck et al., 2008; Armstrong et al., 2010).  
Hence, we argue that greater board independence is expected to be associated with lower 
information asymmetry to the extent that i) more independent boards lead to firms being more 
                                                 
3 In terms of the language used in path analyses, information processing cost has a moderating (as opposed to 
mediating) effect on the effect of board independence on the information environment. 
4 Bushman and Smith (2003) also highlight other channels through which financial accounting information can 
affect economic performance: 1) better identification of good vs. bad projects by managers and investors and; 2) 
discipline on project selection and expropriation by managers. 
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transparent and ii) there is less information asymmetry among the investors of more transparent 
firms (Welker, 1995; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). This argument is also consistent with that of 
Chung et al. (2010), who examine the relation between internal corporate governance and 
information asymmetry. Chung et al. (2010) measure internal corporate governance using a 
governance index that consists of 24 governance attributes. With this index, they show that firms 
with better corporate governance are associated with lower information asymmetry. Apart from 
these, other studies have also examined the relation between the external corporate governance 
of a firm and information asymmetry (e.g., Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002; Brockman and Chung, 
2003). These papers generally find that external corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., legal 
and regulatory environments) that increase shareholder protection are associated with reduced 
information asymmetry. Hence, our first hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, is: 
H1:  Greater board independence reduces the information asymmetry among investors. 
 
2.2 Mediation via voluntary disclosure and information intermediation 
In this paper, we also propose that board independence could influence information 
asymmetry through its effect on transparency of the firm’s information environment. Theory 
generally predicts that better disclosure and increased transparency is likely to reduce 
information asymmetry (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001). Consistent with this theory, many empirical 
studies provide evidence indicating that better disclosure and increased transparency is 
associated with lower information asymmetry (e.g., Welker, 1995; Coller and Yohn, 1997; Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia and Weber, 2006; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007).  
Following Bushman et al. (2004), we conceptualize and characterize the transparency of 
the information environment by: 1) corporate voluntary disclosures made by the firm and; 2) 
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information acquisition and dissemination by information intermediaries. Corporate voluntary 
disclosure refers to the non-mandatory periodic disclosure made by the firm to outside 
stakeholders (such as shareholders, creditors, government agencies, etc.). Information acquisition 
and dissemination by information intermediaries refer to the collection, interpretation, and 
dissemination of information by financial intermediaries for other market participants. Hence, in 
this paper, we examine the effect of board independence on a firm’s information environment 
through voluntary corporate disclosure, and information acquisition and dissemination by 
information intermediaries. 
Of the various forms of corporate voluntary disclosure, management forecast has been 
extensively studied in the literature (Hirst et al., 2008). Recent studies support the notion that 
firms with more independent boards are likely to engage in more voluntary disclosure. For 
example, Ajinkya et al. (2005) show that managers of firms with more outside directors and 
greater institutional ownership are more likely to both issue a forecast and forecast more 
frequently. Similarly, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) show that firms with more effective boards 
and audit committees are more likely to issue and update a forecast. Hence, our next hypothesis, 
stated in the alternative form, is: 
H2a: Greater board independence increases the quantity of corporate voluntary 
disclosure in terms of the frequency of management earnings forecasts. 
Armstrong et al. (2010) argue that independent directors have incentives to attract more 
information acquisition and dissemination by information intermediaries. To carry out their 
monitoring activities, independent directors are unlikely to rely solely on information supplied 
by, and filtered through, managers because managers are not likely to share information that is 
detrimental to their own interests (Jensen, 1993; Verrecchia, 2001). Given this concern, 
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independent directors are likely to seek and facilitate (e.g., via information sharing) other 
channels that aid their monitoring activities. Information intermediaries such as analysts play an 
important role in processing and interpreting financial disclosures made by the firm and in 
acquiring additional information to determine the future financial prospects of the firm. They 
themselves might be attracted to firms that are inherently better monitored because of the greater 
reliability of the information they use in their work. Hence, we expect firms with more 
independent directors to attract more analyst following. Our hypothesis, stated in the alternative 
form, is:  
H2b: Greater board independence increases the amount of information acquisition and 
dissemination by information intermediaries in terms of analyst coverage. 
Finally, we compare and contrast the roles and relative importance of management 
forecast and analyst coverage in mediating the relation between board independence and 
information asymmetry. What appears to be missing in the literature is a within-sample joint 
analysis of the relation between board independence, the firm’s information environment 
mechanisms, and information asymmetry among investors. By conducting such an analysis, we 
are able to better understand the underlying mechanisms linking board independence to 
information asymmetry in the capital markets. Stated differently, it allows us to evaluate the 
extent to which certain aspects of the information environment, specifically, management 
forecasts and analyst coverage, can explain the effect of board independence on information 
asymmetry. In particular, we test the following related hypothesis: 
H2c: Management forecast frequency and analyst coverage mediate the effect of board 
independence on information asymmetry among investors. 
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The information environment variables in our study constitute a small subset of the 
characteristics that capture the degree of transparency in a firm’s information environment. The 
choice of these characteristics is driven by their measurability, as well as the extensive literature 
that has studied them. In practice, it is likely that there are other mediating mechanisms through 
which board independence affects information asymmetry.5 Hence, our study should be regarded 
as an attempt to partially open up the “black box” between board independence and information 
asymmetry among investors. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Sample construction 
We measure the variables used in our empirical analyses with data from the Trade and 
Quotes (TAQ), RiskMetrics, CDA/Spectrum, First Call, I/B/E/S, CRSP, and Compustat 
databases. These databases are available from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). First 
Call provides information on management forecasts (our proxy for voluntary disclosure). We 
collect our data from 1996 onwards because data coverage is incomplete and only becomes more 
extensive after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. We impose a one-year lag 
for the independent variables, to mitigate reverse causality concerns. For example, the stock 
liquidity of a firm in 2005 is matched with the firm’s corporate governance, voluntary disclosure, 
analyst coverage and information asymmetry in 2004. Our sample period is between 1997 and 
2006. 
                                                 
5 For example, there could be public disclosures that are not (directly) related to earnings but which could reduce 
information asymmetry, such as discussions about the future direction of the firm in the annual reports, press 
releases, and conference presentations. Board independence could also affect mechanisms other than public 
disclosures. For example, with better oversight by independent directors, there might be less private communication 
between managers and selected stakeholders and less private-information-based insider trading. 
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Table 1 panel A reports our sample construction. Our initial sample comprises all firms in 
the Riskmetrics database for which Board independence can be computed. We remove 1,380 
observations for which the G-index is unavailable. We then link our dataset to the CRSP 
database via CUSIP. We retain firms which have ordinary shares listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ stock exchanges. We also remove observations for which PIN, Spread, Forecast 
frequency, Analyst coverage, and our set of control variables are unavailable. Our final sample 
comprises 10,744 firm-year observations.  
Table 1 panel B reports the distribution of our observations across our sample period. The 
mean (median) Board independence for our sample firms gradually increases from 60.2 (62.5) 
percent in 1997 to 72.8 (75.0) percent in 2006. The gradual increase in board independence over 
our sample period is consistent with other studies that have also documented a similar over-time 
increase in the mean board independence level (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014). 
The increase is likely to be due to regulatory reforms and shareholder activism, especially in 
response to the accounting scandals involving prominent firms like Enron and WorldCom. For 
example, in 2003, the NYSE and NASDAQ mandated rules that require listed companies to have 
a majority of board members who are independent. NASDAQ (p. 1, 2003) emphasizes that this 
requirement is “part of NASDAQ’s continuous commitment to restoring confidence in the 
markets through enhanced disclosure and transparency”. 
 
3.2 The effect of board independence on information asymmetry among investors 
To test the effect of board independence on information asymmetry among investors 
(H1), we use the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression specification: 
Information asymmetryt+1 = γ0 + γ1Board independencet + γ2Xt + εt+1,                  (1) 
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where Information asymmetryt+1 is proxied by either PIN or Spread. Board independencet is the 
proportion of board members who are independent. Xt is a vector of control variables: Market 
cap, Book-to-market, ROA, Loss, Excess return, Return volatility, Stock turnover, G-index, Ext 
Board Seats, Board size, as well as year and industry fixed effects. Appendix 2 includes the 
detailed definition of all variables.  
Our first information asymmetry measure is Spread, which is the average of the daily 
relative effective bid-ask spreads of a stock. From an information asymmetry perspective, the 
spread measures the compensation that uninformed market participants such as market makers 
demand for the perceived information risk associated with trading with relatively more informed 
traders. We use the intra-day trades and quotes from the TAQ database to calculate spread. To 
ensure data integrity, we remove trades and quotes that are likely to be errors or outliers, as 
discussed in Appendix 1.A. The relative effective spread is based on the notion that trade is only 
costly to the investor to the extent that the trade price deviates from the true price, approximated 
by the bid-ask midpoint. To compute each effective spread, we match each intraday trade to an 
intraday quote using the standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm described in Appendix 1.B. 
This process attempts to remove quotes for which trades have not been executed and could 
potentially reduce the noise from the transaction cost estimation. For each trade-matched quote at 
time s for firm i, we compute the intraday relative effective spread, IntraESpread, as 2|trade 
price — mid-point of bid price and ask price| / trade price, where ask price (bid price) is the ask 
price (bid price) for the quote, and trade price is the price at which the trade is executed. We 
compute the daily relative effective spreads as the average of intraday relative effective spreads. 
Spread is the average of these daily spreads within the year; this average is multiplied by 100 to 
make spread a percentage. 
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Our second information asymmetry measure is the probability of informed-based trading 
(PIN). PIN is based on the market microstructure model specified in Easley et al. (1997), which 
depicts the trading behavior of informed investors. Details of the computation of PIN are 
provided in Appendix 1.C. Specifically, we use the TAQ data and the Lee and Ready (1991) 
algorithm to first estimate the daily number of buy and sell trades in the stock. PIN is then 
estimated by the numerical maximization of the likelihood function of the model. 
We include an extensive number of control variables in our empirical model to mitigate 
the omitted correlated variables problem. We control for firm size (Market cap) and the book-to-
market ratio (Book-to-market), as we expect there to be differences in information asymmetry 
between larger and smaller firms, and between firms with low growth opportunities and those 
with high growth opportunities. Loss firms have greater economic uncertainty compared with 
profitable firms. Hence, we control for firm performance using ROA and Loss because we expect 
the information uncertainty and asymmetry to differ based on firm performance. Prior research 
has shown that stock performance (Excess return), return volatility (Return volatility), and stock 
turnover (Stock turnover) could affect information asymmetry among investors (McInish and 
Wood, 1992; Chung et al., 1999; Stoll, 2000). Hence, we include these market characteristics as 
additional control variables. We also include several governance variables as additional controls. 
We use the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index as a proxy for the strength of the firm’s 
other governance mechanisms. We control for the total number of external independent board 
seats held by the directors of the firm (Ext Board Seats) to control for busyness of the board that 
might influence the directors’ ability to carry out their duties effectively (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009). Finally, we control for number of directors on the board (Board size) because prior work 
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suggests that board size affects firm performance (e.g., Yermack, 1996). For all our regression 
estimation, we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
3.3 The effect of board independence on the information environment  
To test the effect of board independence on the information environment (H2a and H2b), 
we use the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression specification: 
Information environmentt+1 = γ0 + γ1 Board independencet + γ2Xt + εt+1,                 (2) 
where Information environmentt+1 is proxied by either Forecast frequencyt+1 or Analyst 
coveraget+1. Forecast frequency is the number of management forecasts of annual EPS in the 
year; these forecasts are obtained from the First Call Company Issued Guidelines database. 
Analyst Coverage is the average of the monthly number of analysts making forecasts of the 
annual EPS of the firm in each year; these forecasts are obtained from the I/B/E/S summary file. 
Xt is the vector of control variables in equation (1) but further includes Litigation risk, 
R&D, Tangibility, Information cost and Business segments which have been documented to 
affect the firm’s information environment. Appendix 2 includes the detailed definition of these 
variables. We control for Litigation risk using the Rogers and Stocken’s (2005) litigation risk 
model because it might influence the firm’s disclosure policy, financial reporting quality and the 
extent of analyst coverage (Francis et al., 1994; Rogers and Stocken, 2005). The difficulty in 
valuing firms with more research and development could increase the advantage of more 
informed investors, whereas the ease of valuing firms with relatively more tangible assets could 
reduce such an advantage (e.g., Aboody and Lev, 2000; Barth et al., 2001). Therefore, we also 
control for the information advantage of more informed investors using research and 
development intensity (R&D) and asset tangibility (Tangibility), which is measured based on 
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Berger et al. (1996) and Almeida and Campello (2007). The cost of acquiring information about 
a firm and the complexity of its business can affect the disclosures of the firm, as well as the 
effectiveness of information intermediaries. Hence, we add controls for information acquisition 
cost (Information Cost) and business complexity, based on the the number of business segments 
that it operates (Business Segments).  
Finally, to test the mediating effect of information environment on the relationship 
between board independence and information asymmetry (H2c), we include proxies for 
Information environment in equation (1): 
Information asymmetryt+1 = γ0 + γ1 Board independencet + γ2Information environmentt+1 
      + γ3Xt + εt+1,                     (3) 
 In addition, we use path analysis to examine the relative importance of each mediating 
channel through which board independence affects information asymmetry. 
 
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical tests. On 
average, 65.8 percent of the directors of the sample firms are independent. With regard to our 
information asymmetry variables, the mean probability of information-based trading in the 
stocks of our sample firms is 0.125 and the mean effective spread for our sample firms is 0.459.  
Turning to our proxies for information environment, our sample firms make an average 
of about three management forecasts a year and are followed by an average of about ten analysts. 
Our sample firms have an average market cap of $7.8 billion and an average book-to-market 
ratio of 0.50. The average firm in our sample reported an ROA of 4.28 percent, and 13.2 percent 
of our firm-year observations reported a net loss. With regard to market characteristics, our 
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sample firms have a monthly return of 0.005 in excess of the value-weighted market return and a 
mean daily return volatility of 0.104. The average of the monthly ratio of trading volume to 
shares outstanding for our sample is 0.149.  
In terms of other governance characteristics, the mean G-index value for our sample is 
9.24, the average number of independent board seats held by directors of each firm is 2.4, and 
the average board size is 9.6 directors. In terms of other attributes relating to the firm’s 
information environment, the average estimate of our sample firms’ litigation risk exposure is -
2.52, based on the litigation risk model in Rogers and Stocken (2005). Our sample firms also 
have an average R&D expenses to total assets of 8.01 percent, and an average ratio of tangible 
assets to total assets of 0.47. Finally, the adjusted R2 from regressing a firm’s daily stock return 
on market return (information acquisition cost proxy) is 0.19, and an average number of business 
segments of 5.74.  
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations for the main variables used in the regressions. 
Consistent with our expectations, the Pearson correlation coefficients show that Board 
independence is negatively correlated with PIN (-0.156) and Spread (-0.177), and positively 
correlated with, Forecast frequency (0.140) and Analyst coverage (0.102). The aforementioned 
correlations are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 The effect of board independence on information asymmetry among investors 
Table 4 Panel A presents the results of our OLS regressions that examine the effect of 
board independence on information asymmetry among investors, which we proxied using PIN 
and Spread. As predicted in H1, we find a negative and significant association between Board 
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independence and PIN. Specifically, the coefficient on Board independence is -0.015 (t-stat = -
3.01), significant at the 0.01 level. We obtain similar results similar results using Spread as the 
information asymmetry proxy. Specifically, the coefficient on Board independence is -0.097 (t-
stat = -2.30). 
 While we find a significant association between board independence and information 
asymmetry, we are not able to infer whether this relation is causal or simply associative.6 We 
attempt to address this issue by using instrumental variables approach in a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression specification. We utilize two instruments for our 2SLS research 
design. The first instrument, Board connections, is based on social networks among directors and 
is defined as the fraction of the firm’s directors who are also sitting on at least one other firm’s 
board with above median proportion of independent directors of the year. Following Adams and 
Ferreira (2009), we consider board connections to be a potential instrument for a more 
independent board structure because of the notion that social networks among directors have a 
significant influence on the recruitment of independent directors (e.g., Koenig and Gogel, 1981; 
Simon and Warner, 1992; Robins and Alexander, 2004; Jackson and Rogers, 2007; Jackson, 
2009; Hwang and Kim, 2009).7,8 In particular, we argue that a firm’s board is likely to have more 
independent directors if its directors are more socially connected to other independent directors 
whom they can introduce to the firm and/or whom they are more comfortable working with as 
                                                 
6 Many studies have suggested that the findings on the relation between board independence and information 
environment suffer from endogeneity (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Larcker et al., 2007; Armstrong et al., 
2010, 2014; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). 
7 To study how gender-diverse boards affect firm performance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) instrument gender-
diverse boards (i.e., the fraction of female directors on the board) using board connections to female directors (i.e., 
the fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards that have female directors). 
8 For example, Jackson (2009) state “The fact that social networks are an important conduit of information about and 
access to jobs is evident to anyone who has ever looked for employment in almost any profession.” In the case of the 
employment of independent directors to be on the firm’s boards, social networks are likely to play an especially 
important role because there is a small pool of qualified directors to begin with. By definition, independent directors 
have to be from outside the firm. It is highly unlikely that a complete stranger would be added from the outside to 
the board because boards are typically quite small and individual board members can have significant influence on 
the board dynamics. 
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independent directors. These independent directors belong to an exclusive group of corporate 
elite and they help each other obtain outside independent directorships because they share similar 
background and feel committed to each other and to the network. This contention is supported by 
recent work that explores the economic value of social networks and finds that belonging to a 
social network has a significant impact on employment of directors (Ioannids and Loury, 2004; 
Kuhnen, 2009; Barnea and Guedj, 2009). For example, Barnea and Guedj (2009) find that well-
connected independent directors (i.e., directors who have more direct links to other directors in 
the network) are more likely to be awarded more directorships in the future. Specifically, the 
probability of a connected independent director receiving one additional director seat the 
following year is 68% higher than that of an unconnected independent director.9 In a similar 
vein, Kuhnen (2009) finds that mutual fund directors who are more connected are more likely to 
earn additional seats in the future when new funds are offered by management.  
Similar to Adams and Ferreira (2009), we acknowledge that it is not possible to directly 
observe the social networks among board of directors. Instead, we argue that it is reasonable to 
assume that when directors of a firm are sitting on other board(s), especially those with a 
relatively higher proportion of independent directors, the firm is likely to be more networked 
with directors from outside the firm. We argue that social connections to other predominantly 
independent boards are unlikely to be correlated directly with a firm’s information environment, 
as well as the information asymmetry among the firm’s investors. In fact, a review of the 
literature did not reveal any study that suggests that such connections would have endogeneity 
effects. From a conceptual perspective, finding an instrument that the prior literature has not yet 
                                                 
9 The unconditional probability of an independent director getting a new directorship the following year is 2.5%, 
while the same probability for a connected independent director is 4.2%.   
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considered to be an explanatory variable in the second stage regression helps to increase the 
likelihood that the instrument satisfies the exogeneity condition (Adams and Ferreira, 2009).10  
The second instrument, Board locations, is based on the proximity to other firms’ with 
similar corporate governance structure and is defined as the number of external directors located 
in the state where the firm’s headquarters is located in the year. 11  The intuition for this 
instrument is that when there are more external directors in the nearby location of the firm’s 
headquarters, there is a greater supply of independent directors from which the firm can appoint 
as its independent directors. From the independent directors’ perspective, they are also more 
willing to accept additional directorships because serving as an independent director is time-
consuming and thus being on firms’ board that are in close proximity helps save travel time. 
Finally, there may be greater pressure from various stakeholders to increase board independence 
when a firm is located in close proximity with other firms with relatively more independent 
boards. On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that being in a location close to other firms with 
relatively more independent boards will directly influence a firm’s information environment or 
the information asymmetry among the firm’s investors. We use both variables as our instruments 
in our first-stage regression explaining board independence, and we conduct the tests suggested 
by Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and find that these two instruments are relevant and valid. 
Table 4 Panel B presents the results of our 2SLS regressions that examine the effect of 
board independence on a firm’s information asymmetry. The first column presents the results of 
the first stage regression with Board independence as the dependent variable. Board connections 
                                                 
10 The prior literature has used the fraction of a board’s directors who sit on at least one additional board as a proxy 
of “busy directors” (e.g., Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Note that this proxy does not require the additional board(s) to 
have a majority of independent directors. Nevertheless, one might still view Board connections as potentially a 
proxy for busy directors. When directors sit on other boards, there are many outcomes such as i) they get to know 
more directors, ii) they are busier, and iii) they learn more from other directors and of other firms. While we focus 
on the first outcome (i.e., the social connections aspect), to the extent that the other outcomes are unlikely to have a 
direct effect on the information environment, Board connections remains a reasonable instrument. 
11 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this additional instrument. 
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is a very significant predictor of Board independence (t-stat = 16.78). The positive coefficient on 
Board connections indicates that the proportion of independent directors on a board is greater 
when the firm’s board has a higher proportion of directors who also sit on at least one other 
firm’s board with above median proportion of independent directors of the year. Board locations 
is also a significant predictor of Board independence (t-stat = 2.48), which suggests that the 
proportion of independent directors on a board is greater when the firm’s headquarters is located 
in a state with greater number of external directors serving in firms in the year. Diagnostic tests 
of the relevance of Board connections and Board locations as instruments indicate that they are 
powerful: the partial R2 is 0.08, suggesting that they add a reasonable amount of explanatory 
power to the regression. The null hypothesis that these are weak instruments is soundly rejected.  
The F-statistic is statistically significant (F-stat = 142.22) and is above the rule of thumb of 10 
proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997).  The F-statistic also satisfies the higher standard proposed 
by Stock et al. (2002): specifically, it is above the critical value of 11.59 based on the 2SLS size 
of the nominal 5% Wald test.   
In the remaining columns, we present the results of the second-stage regressions with PIN 
and Spread as the dependent variables. We continue to find a highly significant and negative 
association between Board independence and proxies for information asymmetry (t-stats = -7.79 
and -7.43 for PIN and Spread, respectively). The panel beneath the regression results provides 
some diagnostic tests to ascertain the endogeneity of Board independence. The null hypothesis of 
each test is that there is no endogeneity; the test statistic is the F-statistic of Wooldridge’s (1995) 
robust score. The tests indicate that there is an endogeneity issue with both PIN and Spread as 
the dependent variable in the second-stage regression; hence the use of the 2SLS research design 
is supported in this case. Although the J-statistics remain low (0.150 and 0.104, respectively), the 
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result from the over-identification test of all instruments is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels.  This suggests that the instruments meet the commonly accepted threshold 
for validity and are correctly excluded in the second stage regression. Taken together, the results 
from the 2SLS regressions suggest that more independent boards lead to less information 
asymmetry among investors.  
 
4.2 How the information environment mediates the effect of board independence on 
information asymmetry among investors 
Table 5 Panel A presents the results of our OLS regressions that the association between 
a firm’s board independence and its information environment. We proxy for the firm’s 
information environment mechanisms using Forecast frequency and Analyst coverage. 
Consistent with H2a and H2b, we find board independence is positive and significantly 
associated with more frequent forecasts and greater analyst coverage (t-stat = 2.45 and 3.64, 
respectively). Turning to Panel B of Table 5, we find some evidence that more frequent 
management forecasts and greater analyst coverage are associated with lower information 
asymmetry. Specifically, using PIN (Spread) as the dependent variable, the coefficients on 
Forecast frequency and Analyst coverage are -0.000 (-0.001) and -0.003 (-0.016), respectively. 
All the coefficients, except Forecast frequency using Spread as the dependent variable, are 
significant at the 0.05 level or better. Therefore, consistent with H2c, we find that forecast 
frequency and analyst coverage mediate the association between board independence and 
information asymmetry. 
We also observe that after adding the information environment variables — Forecast 
frequency and Analyst coverage — to the regressions in equation (1), the negative association 
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between PIN and Board independence remains significant, while the negative association 
between and between Spread and Board independence becomes weakly significant. Specifically, 
the coefficient on Board independence using PIN as the dependent variable is -0.010 (t-stat  = -
2.12) and the coefficient on Board independence using Spread as the dependent variable is -
0.066 (t-stat  = -1.60).  This result suggests that the board independence has both a direct effect 
on information asymmetry, as well as an indirect effect on information asymmetry through 
increased transparency in the information environment. 
Taken together, the results in Table 5 suggest that board independence reduces 
information asymmetry among investors, and that the effect of board independence on 
information asymmetry is incremental to that reduction via increased forecast frequency and 
analyst coverage.  
Next, we use path analysis to further explore the relative importance of each information 
environment variable in mediating the effect of board independence on information asymmetry. 
In path analysis, mediated pathways (those acting through a mediating variable, i.e., “Y,” in the 
pathway X o Y o Z) can be examined. Path analysis formalizes these relations using a series of 
structural equations, which are then depicted diagrammatically for ease of conceptualization and 
clarity. In this study, an indirect effect refers to the role of board independence on information 
asymmetry that is expected to be mediated through the hypothesized mediating mechanisms of 
voluntary disclosure and analyst coverage. A direct effect is the effect of board independence on 
information asymmetry that is not mediated through any of the mechanisms.  
We use path analysis to decompose the effect of board independence on information 
asymmetry into indirect and direct effects. Path analysis is commonly regarded as a special case 
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of structural equation modeling.12 It is a statistical technique that is used mainly to understand 
the comparative strengths of direct and indirect relationships among a set of variables (Ullman, 
1996) and it has been used in studies such as Bushee and Noe (2000), Barton and Mercer (2005), 
and Bhattacharya et al. (2012). Specifically, we examine the indirect role of Board independence 
in influencing two distinct information quality variables, Forecast frequency and Analyst 
coverage, and we consequently test the relative impact of these mediating variables on our 
outcome variable, information asymmetry, as proxied by PIN and Spread. We also model the 
direct role of Board independence in influencing PIN and Spread to capture all unmodeled latent 
variables that could possibly explain the relation between board independence and information 
asymmetry. 
Panels A and B of Table 6 present the path coefficients for the indirect and direct effects 
from board independence to information asymmetry. All the path coefficients are standardized 
for meaningful comparisons among the paths (Bushee and Noe, 2000). The path coefficients 
between board independence and information environment are obtained from regression results 
in Table 5 Panel A while the path coefficients between information environment and information 
asymmetry, and the direct path coefficient between board independence and information 
asymmetry, are obtained from regression results in Table 5 Panel B.  To compare the strengths of 
the two mediated variables, we use the standard procedure in path analysis of multiplying the 
path coefficients across the respective pathways. For example, the relative impact linking Board 
independence to PIN through Analyst coverage  is obtained by multiplying the mediating path 
coefficients 1.908 and -0.003, to arrive at -0.005.  
                                                 
12 Unlike structural equation modeling, which deals with both measured and latent variables, path analysis is 
regarded as a special case of structural equation modeling in that the latent variables are explicitly specified. 
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In Table 6, Panel A, we observe that the total effect of Board independence on PIN is -
0.019. Given that standardized coefficients are used, this result means that a one standard 
deviation increase in Board independence is associated with a 0.105 standard deviation decline 
in PIN, which translates to about 5.3% reduction in PIN.13 The effects of Board independence on 
PIN through Forecast frequency and Analyst coverage, are -0.004 and -0.005, respectively.  
Among the two mediating variables, the more economically significant mediated effect is 
the pathway through Analyst coverage (-0.005). The impact of board independence on 
information asymmetry through voluntary disclosure is relatively smaller: about 55.6% 
(0.005/0.009) of the total mediated effect is through analyst coverage. The results suggest that 
the role of independent boards in attracting more analysts to cover the firm has the greater 
relative impact in alleviating information asymmetry among investors. The role of independent 
boards in increasing voluntary disclosure appears to be relatively less important in reducing 
information asymmetry. 
Turning to Table 6, Panel B, we observe that the total effect of Board independence on 
Spread is -0.098. Given that standardized coefficients are used, this result means that a one 
standard deviation increase in Board independence is associated with a 0.098 standard deviation 
decline in Spread, which translates to about 12.7% reduction in Spread. The results of the path 
analysis using Spread are similar to those using PIN. Specifically, the effects of Board 
independence on Spread through Forecast frequency and Analyst coverage, are -0.001 and -
0.031, respectively. Likewise, we observe that the more economically significant mediated effect 
among the two mediating variables is through Analyst coverage (-0.031). The impact of Board 
independence on information asymmetry through voluntary disclosure is relatively smaller: 
                                                 
13 One standard deviation in PIN is 0.0632, and hence the impact of 0.015 standard deviation decline in PIN is 
(0.0632 x 0.015) divided by 0.1247 (mean value of PIN) = 5.32%. The other comparative statics are computed 
analogously. 
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about 96.9% (0.031/0.032) of the total mediated effect is through analyst coverage. Overall, the 
results in Table 6 reveal that while voluntary disclosure and analyst coverage mediate the effect 
of board independence on information asymmetry among investors, the influence of analyst 
coverage is more dominant.  
 
4.3 Alternate measure of PIN based on the information asymmetry component of PIN 
 In this paper, we use PIN as one of our proxy for information asymmetry. Duarte and 
Young (2009) find that PIN can be decomposed into two components: one related to information 
asymmetry and another related to illiquidity. Given that our paper focuses on whether board 
independence is related to information asymmetry specifically, in a robustness test, we re-run our 
analyses using the information asymmetry component of PIN (Adj_PIN) as our proxy of 
information asymmetry following Duarte and Young (2009). Our available data for Adj_PIN 
spans from 1997 – 2003, and the result is presented in Table 7.14 As observed from this table, we 
still observe a negative and significant association between Board independence and Adj_PIN, 
both before and after controlling for information environment proxies. The result is also 
quantitatively similar to that documented using PIN as the proxy for information asymmetry in 
Table 4. In untabulated analyses, we find that this result is also robust to the use of the 2SLS 
regression technique in Table 4. This suggests that our inferences are unchanged using an 
alternate measure of PIN based on Duarte and Young (2009). 
 
4.4 Alternative approaches to deal with cross-correlation in error terms 
 There are several approaches to estimating standard errors for regression coefficients that 
account for cross-sectional and/or time-series dependence in the error terms (Petersen, 2009, 
                                                 
14 We thank the authors for sharing the data on Adj_PIN with us. 
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Gow et al., 2010). To examine the robustness of our results, we rerun the OLS regressions in 
Table 4 Panel A, Table 5 Panel A, and Table 5 Panel B using two approaches. Table 8 Panel A 
presents the results with two-way clustering of the standard errors by firm and by year. This 
approach allows for both cross-sectional and time-series dependence in the error terms. Panel B 
presents the results of using the Fama-MacBeth approach; the regressions are first run for each 
year and the average coefficients and corresponding t-statistics across the years are then 
computed. This approach is designed to address concerns about cross-sectional correlation and 
assumes that the yearly estimates of the coefficient are independent of each other. For 
parsimony, we report only the coefficients and the t-statistics of the key independent variables of 
each regression. As observed from both Panels A and B, the statistical significance of our test 
variables are quantitatively similar to those reported before and thus our inferences are 
unchanged using alternative approaches to deal with cross-correlation in the error terms. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether greater board independence leads to an improvement 
in the information environment and reduced information asymmetry among investors. With bid-
ask spreads and PIN as our proxies for information asymmetry among investors, we find that a 
more independent board leads to lower information asymmetry. With regard to the information 
environment, we show that greater board independence leads to greater management forecast 
frequency and broader analyst coverage. Not only that, we find that greater board independence 
is still significantly associated with lower information asymmetry when we include voluntary 
disclosure and analyst coverage as additional controls in our regressions. This result suggests that 
the board independence has both a direct effect on information asymmetry, as well as an indirect 
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effect on information asymmetry through increased transparency in the information environment. 
To further examine the indirect effects, we develop a framework that lays out how the 
information environment could drive the relation between board independence and information 
asymmetry among investors. Using path analysis as an empirical tool to test this framework, we 
find that board independence affects information asymmetry though voluntary disclosure and 
analyst coverage. The more significant mediating mechanism driving the relation between board 
independence and information asymmetry appear to be analyst coverage. In contrast, the 
mediating effect through voluntary disclosure appears to be smaller.  
 Overall, our paper provides an incremental contribution to the existing corporate 
governance research by identifying the effect of board independence on the information 
environment. This identification is important because actions by regulators and firms are based 
on the belief that greater board independence can improve transparency. In addition, by studying 
the underlying mechanisms that link board independence to the firm’s information environment, 
the paper addresses the question of how board independence could be associated with 
information asymmetry. In conducting our study, we utilize a parsimonious and empirically 
testable framework that links board independence to information asymmetry. We then make use 
of path analysis to analyze, within sample, the different paths through which we expect board 
independence to be associated with information asymmetry.  
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Appendix 1 
1.A – Cleaning the NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database 
To compute the market microstructure variables from January 1993 to December 2007, 
we use the intra-day quotes and trades from the NYSE TAQ database, which consists of a trades 
file and a quotes file. To ensure data integrity, we remove the errors and outliers from the files. 
 
For the trades file, we retain the following: 
1. Trades inside regular trading hours (9:30-16:00); 
2. Good trades (corr = 0, 1); 
3. Regular sale conditions (cond = blank or *);  
4. Trades with a positive trade price (price > 0) and a positive trade size (siz > 0); 
5. Trades with an absolute change in trade price from the previous trade price of less than or 
equal to 10%. 
 
For the quotes file, we retain the following: 
1. Quotes inside regular trading hours (9:30-16:00); 
2. Regular quotes (mode = 12); 
3. Quotes with a positive bid price (bid > 0), a positive ask price (ofr > 0), a bid price 
greater than the ask price (ofr > bid), a positive bid size (bidsiz > 0) or a positive ask size 
(ofrsiz > 0); 
4. Quotes with relative quoted spreads of less than or equal to 20%; 
5. Quotes with an absolute change in bid price from the previous bid price in each day of 
less than or equal to 10% and with an absolute change in ask price from the previous ask 
price in each day of less than or equal to 10%; 
6. For the computation of relative effective spreads only, quotes with relative effective 
spreads of less than or equal to 20%. 
 
1.B Matching of trades and quotes 
The matching of trades and quotes is required for the computation of effective spreads. In 
combining the trades and quotes, we take the following steps. Following Lee and Ready (1991), 
we match each trade with the latest available quote from at least five seconds earlier. Then, as in 
Huang and Stoll (1997), we collapse all trades that took place at the same price and quotes (bid 
price and ask price) into a single trade. According to Huang and Stoll, “a large order may be 
executed at a single price but be reported in a series of smaller trades” and “a single large limit 
order may be executed at a single price against various incoming market orders”. 
 
1.C Computation of PIN 
PIN measures the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders in 
individual stocks. Its value is estimated by the numerical maximization of the likelihood function 
of the underlying market microstructure model specified in Easley et al. (1997). This model is a 
learning model in which market makers draw inferences about the probability of information 
asymmetry based on the observed order flow. Specifically, the model uses the number of daily 
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buys and daily sells within a certain period, usually a quarter or a year, to estimate PIN.15 Within 
each day, trades are assumed to arrive in the market sequentially according to Poisson processes. 
Mathematically, the model specifies that, on any day i, the likelihood of observing the number of 
buys Bi and the number of sells Si is given by: 
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where  = ( )B S, , , ,T D G P H H are the five structural parameters in the model to be estimated, D is the 
probability of an information event occurring, G is the probability of good news when an 
information event occurs, P is the daily arrival rate of informed traders on a day when an 
information event occurs, BH  is the daily arrival rate of buy orders from uninformed traders who 
are not aware of the new information, and SH is the daily arrival rate of sell orders from 
uninformed traders who are not aware of the new information.  
 
Trading is a game between a market maker and a trader that repeats over the trading days 
within the period. Assuming that the days are independent, the joint likelihood of observing a 
series of daily buys and daily sells over trading days i = 1,..., I is the product of daily likelihoods: 
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where 1 1(( ),...,( ))I IM B ,S B ,S represents the dataset. 
Maximizing the joint likelihood in Eq. (C2) over the parameters in θ provides the 
estimates of the parameters. Since there is no closed form solution to the maximization problem, 
numerical maximization is used to estimate the parameters. Using the estimated parameters, the 
PIN can be estimated using the following equation: 
 
B S
PIN DPDP H H               (C3) 
In Eq. (C3), the numerator is the expected number of orders from privately informed 
investors and the denominator is the number of orders each day. Hence, the PIN is the expected 
fraction of trades that are information based.     
                                                 
15 The order flow of each trade is classified as a buy or a sell using the standard Lee-Ready algorithm (Lee and 
Ready, 1991), which involves a “quote test” and a “tick test”. For the “quote test”, any trade that takes place above 
(below) the midpoint of the current quoted spread is classified as a buy (sell) order because trades originating from 
buyers (sellers) are most likely to be executed at or near the ask (bid). For trades taking place at the midpoint, a “tick 
test” is used to classify the trade. This test classifies a trade as a buy (sell) order if the trade price is above (below) 
the previous price. In the event there is no change in the trade price, the order flow is regarded as indeterminable and 
the trade is not used in computations. The daily number of buy orders and sell orders is determined by adding up the 
number of orders in each category for each day for each firm. 
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Appendix 2: Variables Definition (in alphabetical order) 
Adj_PIN The information asymmetry component of PIN, based on Duarte 
and Young (2009). 
Analyst coverage The average of the monthly number of analysts following the firm. 
Board connections The fraction of directors who are also sitting on at least one other 
board with above median proportion of independent directors of the 
year. 
Board 
independence 
The proportion of board members who are independent. 
Board locations The number of external directors located in the state where the 
firm’s headquarters is located in the year. 
Board size The number of directors on the board. 
Book-to-market 
ratio 
The ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. 
Business segments The number of segments the firm has. 
Excess return The average of the monthly difference between the firm’s return and 
the value-weighted market index. 
Ext Board Seats The total number of external independent board seats held by the 
directors of the firm. 
Forecast frequency The total number of annual and quarterly management forecasts of 
earnings per share. 
G-index The index of corporate governance constructed by Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick (2003); it consists of 24 antitakeover and shareholder 
rights provisions. 
Information cost The proxy for information acquisition cost, measured as the 
negative of the R2 from the regression of firm daily returns on 
market returns, following Bhushan (1989). 
Litigation risk The estimate of the firm’s litigation risk exposure based on the 
litigation risk model in Rogers and Stocken (2005). According to 
this model, the litigation risk of a firm in each calendar quarter is 
defined as: -5.738 + 0.141 x Size + 0.284 x Turn + 0.012 x Beta - 
0.237 x Returns - 1.340 x Std_Ret + 0.011 x Skewness - 3.161 x 
Min_Ret - 0.025 x Bio_Tech + 0.378 x Computer Hardware + 0.075 
x Electronics - 0.034 x Retailing + 0.211 x Computer Software; 
where Size is the natural log of the average market value of equity 
measured in dollars, Beta is the slope coefficient from regressing 
daily returns on the CRSP Equal-Weighted index, Returns is 
defined as buy and hold returns, Std_Ret is the standard deviation of 
the daily returns, Skewness is defined as the skewness of the daily 
returns, Min_Ret is the minimum of the daily returns, 
Bio_Technology is an industry indicator variable equaling one if the 
firm is in the bio-tech industry (SIC 2833 to 2836) and zero 
otherwise, Computer Hardware is an industry indicator variable 
equaling one if the firm is in the computer hardware industry (SIC 
3570 to 3577) and zero otherwise, Electronics is an industry 
indicator variable equaling one if the firm is in the electronics 
industry (SIC 3600 to 3674) and zero otherwise, Retailing is an 
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industry indicator variable equaling one if the firm is in the retail 
industry (SIC 5200 to 5961) and zero otherwise, and Computer 
Software is an industry indicator variable equaling one if the firm is 
in the computer software industry (SIC 7371 to 7379) and zero 
otherwise. To measure the litigation risk in a year, we take the 
average across four quarters. 
Loss An indicator variable equaling one if the firm has negative net 
income before extraordinary items, zero otherwise. 
Market cap The average of the monthly closing capitalization of the ordinary 
shares of the firm (in trillions). 
PIN The probability of information-based trading. 
R&D The research and development expenses scaled by total assets. 
ROA The return on assets of the firm. 
Return volatility The standard deviation of monthly returns. 
Stock turnover The average of the monthly ratio of trading volume to shares 
outstanding. 
Spread The average of the daily relative effective bid-ask spread (in 
percent). 
Tangibility The amount of tangible assets scaled by total assets. Berger et al. 
(1996), in determining the asset liquidation value, find that a dollar 
of book value yields, on average, 72 cents in asset value for total 
receivables, 55 cents for inventory, and 54 cents for fixed assets. 
Therefore, tangible assets is defined as: 0.715 x Receivables + 0.547 
x Inventory + 0.535 x Capital + Cash; where Receivables is total 
receivables, Inventory is total inventory, Capital is plant, property, 
and equipment, and Cash is cash and short-term investments.  
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TABLE 1 Sample construction 
 
This table provides a description of the sample that is used in this study. Panel A describes the construction of the 
sample used in all the analyses. Panel B presents the distribution of the sample across the years; the year is based on 
the year of the meeting date recorded in the Riskmetrics database. Board independence is the proportion of board 
members who are independent. PIN is the probability of information-based trading. Spread is the average of the 
daily relative effective bid-ask spread (in percents). Market cap is the average of the monthly closing capitalization 
of the ordinary shares of the firm (in trillions). Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity. ROA is the return on assets of the firm. Loss is an indicator variable equaling one if the firm 
has negative net income before extraordinary items, zero otherwise. Excess return is the average of the monthly 
difference between the firm’s return and the value-weighted market index. Return volatility is the standard deviation 
of monthly returns. Stock turnover is the average of the monthly ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding. G-
index is the index of corporate governance constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003); it consists of 24 
antitakeover and shareholder rights provisions. Ext Board Seats is the total number of external independent board 
seats held by the directors of the firm. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Forecast frequency is the 
total number of annual and quarterly management forecasts of earnings per share. Analyst coverage is the average of 
the monthly number of analysts following the firm. Litigation risk is the estimate of the firm’s litigation risk 
exposure based on the litigation risk model in Rogers and Stocken (2005). R&D is the research and development 
expenses scaled by total assets. Tangibility is the amount of tangible assets scaled by total assets. Information cost is 
the proxy for information acquisition cost, measured as the negative of the R2 from the regression of firm daily 
returns on market returns. Business segments is the number of segments the firm has. 
 
Panel A: Sample construction 
 
  Observations 
  
For the sample period from 1997 to 2006, all firms in the Riskmetrics database for which Board 
independence can be computed. 14,023
  
Remove observations for which the G-index is not available from the Riskmetrics database. 12,643 
  
Link observations from Riskmetrics database to CRSP database via CUSIP. Remove firms that do 
not have ordinary shares (share code 10 and 11) listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (exchange 
codes 1, 2, and 3 respectively) as at the annual general meeting date. 12,502 
  
Remove observations for which PIN and Spread, which are computed using intraday data from the  
TAQ database, are not available. 11,284 
 
Remove observations for which the following control variables are not available: Market cap, Book-
to-market, ROA, Loss, Excess return, Return volatility, Stock turnover, G-index, Ext Board Seats, 
Board size, Litigation risk, R&D, Tangibility, Information cost, and Business segments. 10,744 
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Panel B: Distribution of sample across years 
 
Year Firms 
Board independence 
Mean Median 
1997 803 0.602 0.625 
1998 1148 0.590 0.615 
1999 1059 0.606 0.625 
2000 1107 0.618 0.636 
2001 1098 0.639 0.667 
2002 1125 0.661 0.667 
2003 1087 0.689 0.714 
2004 1155 0.706 0.714 
2005 1100 0.722 0.750 
2006 1062 0.728 0.750 
Total 10,744     
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TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the variables in this study. This sample consists of 10,744 firm-year 
observations from 1,947 firms. Board independence is the proportion of board members who are independent. PIN 
is the probability of information-based trading. Spread is the average of the daily relative effective bid-ask spread 
(in percents). Market cap is the average of the monthly closing capitalization of the ordinary shares of the firm (in 
trillions). Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. ROA is the 
return on assets of the firm. Loss is an indicator variable equaling one if the firm has negative net income before 
extraordinary items, zero otherwise. Excess return is the average of the monthly difference between the firm’s return 
and the value-weighted market index. Return volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns. Stock turnover 
is the average of the monthly ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding. G-index is the index of corporate 
governance constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003); it consists of 24 antitakeover and shareholder rights 
provisions. Ext Board Seats is the total number of external independent board seats held by the directors of the firm. 
Board size is the number of directors on the board. Forecast frequency is the total number of annual and quarterly 
management forecasts of earnings per share. Analyst coverage is the average of the monthly number of analysts 
following the firm. Litigation risk is the estimate of the firm’s litigation risk exposure based on the litigation risk 
model in Rogers and Stocken (2005). R&D is the research and development expenses scaled by total assets. 
Tangibility is the amount of tangible assets scaled by total assets. Information cost is the proxy for information 
acquisition cost, measured as the negative of the R2 from the regression of firm daily returns on market returns. 
Business segments is the number of segments the firm has. 
 
  Mean Std Dev 
Lower 
Median 
Upper 
Quartile Quartile 
Board independence 0.6575 0.1764 0.5556 0.6667 0.8000 
PIN 0.1247 0.0632 0.0893 0.1155 0.1523 
Spread 0.4590 0.5970 0.1610 0.2783 0.5203 
Market cap 0.0078 0.0250 0.0006 0.0017 0.0051 
Book-to-market 0.4961 0.4394 0.2617 0.4280 0.6272 
ROA 0.0428 0.1018 0.0149 0.0447 0.0833 
Loss 0.1315 0.3380 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Excess return 0.0049 0.0356 -0.0134 0.0033 0.0223 
Return volatility 0.1044 0.0659 0.0639 0.0898 0.1282 
Stock turnover 0.1491 0.1357 0.0674 0.1077 0.1832 
G-index 9.2374 2.7122 7.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
Ext Board Seats 2.4080 3.3765 0.0000 1.0000 3.0000 
Board size 9.5558 2.8000 8.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
Forecast frequency 2.9885 4.0512 0.0000 1.0000 5.0000 
Analyst coverage 10.4297 7.4346 4.6667 8.9167 14.9167 
Litigation risk -2.5175 0.2359 -2.6816 -2.5476 -2.3797 
R&D 0.0801 2.3666 0.0000 0.0000 0.0304 
Tangibility 0.4712 0.1424 0.3854 0.4785 0.5512 
Information cost 0.1948 0.1358 0.0832 0.1794 0.2822 
Business segments 5.7429 5.3073 1.0000 3.0000 9.0000 
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TABLE 3 Correlations among key variables 
 
This table provides the Pearson correlations for the key variables in this study. The variables are defined in Table 2. 
All the correlations are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
  
  Board Forecast Analyst PIN Spread 
  independence frequency coverage     
Board independence 0.140 0.102 -0.156 -0.177 
Forecast frequency  0.161 -0.176 -0.189 
 
Analyst coverage   -0.427 -0.325 
  
PIN    0.453 
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TABLE 4 Regressions of information asymmetry on board independence 
 
This table reports the results of the regressions that examine the effect of Board independence on information 
asymmetry, as proxied by PIN and Spread. Panel A reports the results based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and 
Panel B reports the results based on two-stage least squares (2SLS). A constant sample of 10,744 observations from 
1,947 firms is used in the regressions. Board independence is the proportion of board members who are 
independent. PIN is the probability of information-based trading. Spread is the average of the daily relative effective 
bid-ask spread (in percents). Market cap is the average of the monthly closing capitalization of the ordinary shares 
of the firm (in trillions). Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. 
ROA is the return on assets of the firm. Loss is an indicator variable equaling one if the firm has negative net income 
before extraordinary items, zero otherwise. Excess return is the average of the monthly difference between the 
firm’s return and the value-weighted market index. Return volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns. 
Stock turnover is the average of the monthly ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding. G-index is the index of 
corporate governance constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003); it consists of 24 antitakeover and 
shareholder rights provisions. Ext Board Seats is the total number of external independent board seats held by the 
directors of the firm. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Board connections is the fraction of 
directors who are also sitting on at least one other board with above median proportion of independent directors of 
the year. Board locations is the number of external directors located in the state where the firm’s headquarters is 
located in the year. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. Tests 
of the validity of the 2SLS research design are found at the bottom of Panel B. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression 
 
       PIN   Spread 
       
Constant    0.186***  0.720*** 
    (13.74)  (5.40) 
Board independence    -0.015***  -0.097** 
    (-3.01)  (-2.30) 
Market cap    -0.250***  -0.568*** 
    (-4.73)  (-3.06) 
Book-to-market    0.022***  0.271*** 
    (6.82)  (6.17) 
ROA    -0.038***  -0.457*** 
    (-5.22)  (-4.52) 
Loss    0.003  0.170*** 
    (1.31)  (5.87) 
Excess return    -0.172***  -4.989*** 
    (-10.47)  (-16.88) 
Return volatility    0.111***  2.525*** 
    (8.55)  (8.77) 
Stock turnover    -0.098***  -0.871*** 
    (-11.52)  (-9.84) 
G-index    -0.001***  -0.005* 
    (-3.42)  (-1.70) 
Ext Board Seats    -0.002***  -0.010*** 
    (-7.88)  (-6.00) 
Board size    -0.003***  -0.027*** 
    (-7.22)  (-10.31) 
Year fixed effects    Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects    Yes  Yes 
       
Adjusted R-square       0.2432   0.4422 
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Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regression 
 
    Board 
independence 
  PIN   Spread 
  1st stage   2nd stage  2nd stage 
       
Constant  0.524***  0.252***  1.214*** 
  (6.81)  (10.58)  (7.74) 
Board connections  0.262***     
  (16.78)     
Board locations  0.000**     
  (2.48)     
Board independence    -0.137***  -1.018*** 
    (-7.79)  (-7.43) 
Market cap  -0.221**  -0.243***  -0.521*** 
  (-1.99)  (-5.40)  (-2.94) 
Book-to-market  0.008  0.022***  0.272*** 
  (1.50)  (7.08)  (6.34) 
ROA  -0.027  -0.043***  -0.495*** 
  (-1.13)  (-5.33)  (-4.68) 
Loss  0.004  0.004  0.175*** 
  (0.58)  (1.50)  (5.97) 
Excess return  -0.022  -0.173***  -5.000*** 
  (-0.52)  (-10.05)  (-17.04) 
Return volatility  -0.087**  0.096***  2.412*** 
  (-2.13)  (7.16)  (8.93) 
Stock turnover  0.068***  -0.087***  -0.791*** 
  (3.01)  (-9.78)  (-8.89) 
G-index  0.009***  0.000  0.005 
  (6.89)  (0.33)  (1.52) 
Ext Board Seats  0.003***  -0.001*  0.000 
  (3.09)  (-1.78)  (0.21) 
Board size  -0.002*  -0.003***  -0.028*** 
  (-1.69)  (-6.78)  (-9.40) 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
R-square   0.3041   0.1558   0.3866 
Tests of weak instrument:       
     Partial R2  0.075     
     F-statistic  142.216***     
Test of no endogeneity:       
     F-statistic    58.365***  52.423*** 
Test of overidentification:  
    Sargan's statistic       0.150   0.104 
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TABLE 5 Regressions of information asymmetry on board independence and 
information quality proxies 
 
This table reports the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that examine the effect of Board 
independence on information quality, as proxied by Forecast Frequency and Analyst coverage (Panel A), and the 
effect of Board independence on information asymmetry, as proxied by PIN and Spread, after controlling for 
information quality proxies (Panel B). A constant sample of 10,744 observations from 1,947 firms is used in the 
regressions. Board independence is the proportion of board members who are independent. PIN is the probability of 
information-based trading. Spread is the average of the daily relative effective bid-ask spread (in percents). Market 
cap is the average of the monthly closing capitalization of the ordinary shares of the firm (in trillions). Book-to-
market ratio is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. ROA is the return on assets of the 
firm. Loss is an indicator variable equaling one if the firm has negative net income before extraordinary items, zero 
otherwise. Excess return is the average of the monthly difference between the firm’s return and the value-weighted 
market index. Return volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns. Stock turnover is the average of the 
monthly ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding. G-index is the index of corporate governance constructed by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003); it consists of 24 antitakeover and shareholder rights provisions. Ext Board Seats 
is the total number of external independent board seats held by the directors of the firm. Board size is the number of 
directors on the board. Forecast frequency is the total number of annual and quarterly management forecasts of 
earnings per share. Analyst coverage is the average of the monthly number of analysts following the firm. Litigation 
risk is the estimate of the firm’s litigation risk exposure based on the litigation risk model in Rogers and Stocken 
(2005). R&D is the research and development expenses scaled by total assets. Tangibility is the amount of tangible 
assets scaled by total assets. Information cost is the proxy for information acquisition cost, measured as the negative 
of the R2 from the regression of firm daily returns on market returns. Business segments is the number of segments 
the firm has. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Board independence and information quality 
 
        Forecast   Analyst 
        Frequency   Coverage 
       
Constant    10.008***  59.287*** 
    (8.56)  (33.34) 
Board independence    0.854**  1.908*** 
    (2.45)  (3.64) 
Market cap    1.981  17.891** 
    (0.44)  (2.23) 
Book-to-market    -0.354***  -0.105 
    (-2.97)  (-0.73) 
ROA    0.889*  2.663*** 
    (1.87)  (3.29) 
Loss    -0.909***  -0.104 
    (-6.83)  (-0.51) 
Litigation risk    3.346***  21.581*** 
    (9.55)  (36.25) 
R&D    -0.002  -0.041*** 
    (-0.65)  (-4.21) 
Tangibility    -2.593***  0.005 
    (-5.31)  (0.01) 
Information cost    -2.445***  0.135 
    (-5.03)  (0.22) 
Business segments    0.011  -0.070*** 
    (0.69)  (-3.49) 
G-index    0.082***  0.079** 
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    (3.37)  (2.08) 
Ext Board Seats    0.004  0.084*** 
    (0.21)  (2.73) 
Board size    0.018  0.229*** 
    (0.71)  (5.77) 
Year fixed effects    Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects    Yes  Yes 
       
Adjusted R-square       0.2679   0.6287 
 
Panel B: Board independence, information quality and information asymmetry 
 
        PIN   Spread 
       
Constant    0.181***  0.694*** 
    (16.65)  (5.32) 
Board independence    -0.010**  -0.066 
    (-2.12)  (-1.60) 
Forecast frequency    -0.000**  -0.001 
    (-2.45)  (-0.84) 
Analyst coverage    -0.003***  -0.016*** 
    (-19.98)  (-15.77) 
Market cap    0.001  0.931*** 
    (0.05)  (4.29) 
Book-to-market    0.016***  0.236*** 
    (6.20)  (5.78) 
ROA    -0.024***  -0.373*** 
    (-3.62)  (-3.96) 
Loss    0.003  0.173*** 
    (1.45)  (6.10) 
Excess return    -0.171***  -4.984*** 
    (-11.14)  (-17.28) 
Return volatility    0.078***  2.329*** 
    (6.72)  (8.58) 
Stock turnover    -0.051***  -0.589*** 
    (-7.49)  (-7.48) 
G-index    -0.001***  -0.003 
    (-2.92)  (-1.16) 
Ext Board Seats    -0.001***  -0.005*** 
    (-4.85)  (-3.05) 
Board size    -0.001***  -0.017*** 
    (-3.93)  (-7.03) 
Year fixed effects    Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects    Yes  Yes 
       
Adjusted R-square       0.2973   0.4639 
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TABLE 6 Path analysis of the relation between board independence and information 
asymmetry 
 
This table reports the path analysis of the relation between board independence and information asymmetry into 
indirect and direct effects. Panels A and B presents the path analysis with PIN and Spread, respectively, as the proxy 
for information asymmetry. In these panels, the following acronyms are used for brevity: BI – Board independence; 
FF –Forecast frequency; AC – Analyst coverage; PIN – PIN; S – Spread. 
 
Panel A: Decomposition of the effect of Board independence on PIN 
 
Board independence (BI) on PIN (PIN)       
Indirect effects Mediating path coefficients 
BI -> FF -> PIN 0.854 -0.004 -0.004 
BI -> AC -> PIN 1.908 -0.003 -0.005 
Total indirect effects -0.009 
Direct effect 
BI -> PIN -0.010 
Total effect          -0.019 
 
Panel B: Decomposition of the effect of Board independence on Spread 
 
Board independence (BI) on Spread (S)       
Indirect effects Mediating path coefficients 
BI -> FF -> S 0.854 -0.001 -0.001 
BI -> AC -> S 1.908 -0.016 -0.031 
Total indirect effects -0.032 
Direct effect 
BI -> S -0.066 
Total effect          -0.098 
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TABLE 7 Regressions of adjusted PIN on board independence and information quality  
 
This table reports the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that examine the effect of Board 
independence on the information asymmetry component of PIN (Adj_PIN). Board independence is the proportion of 
board members who are independent. Forecast frequency is the total number of annual and quarterly management 
forecasts of earnings per share. Analyst coverage is the average of the monthly number of analysts following the 
firm. Market cap is the average of the monthly closing capitalization of the ordinary shares of the firm (in trillions). 
Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. ROA is the return on 
assets of the firm. Loss is an indicator variable equaling one if the firm has negative net income before extraordinary 
items, zero otherwise. Excess return is the average of the monthly difference between the firm’s return and the 
value-weighted market index. Return volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns. Stock turnover is the 
average of the monthly ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding. G-index is the index of corporate governance 
constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003); it consists of 24 antitakeover and shareholder rights provisions. 
Ext Board Seats is the total number of external independent board seats held by the directors of the firm. Board size 
is the number of directors on the board. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
        Adj_PIN   Adj_PIN 
       
Constant    0.169***  0.162*** 
    (12.81)  (15.07) 
Board independence    -0.015***  -0.007* 
    (-3.15)  (-1.79) 
Forecast frequency      -0.001*** 
      (-3.66) 
Analyst coverage      -0.002*** 
      (-19.61) 
Market cap    -0.312***  -0.063** 
    (-4.38)  (-2.38) 
Book-to-market    0.018***  0.013*** 
    (5.51)  (5.20) 
ROA    -0.044***  -0.034*** 
    (-3.43)  (-3.07) 
Loss    -0.001  0.000 
    (-0.33)  (0.09) 
Excess return    -0.153***  -0.146*** 
    (-9.26)  (-9.43) 
Return volatility    0.124***  0.093*** 
    (8.27)  (6.89) 
Stock turnover    -0.152***  -0.083*** 
    (-10.54)  (-7.02) 
G-index    -0.000  -0.000 
    (-0.74)  (-0.32) 
Ext Board Seats    -0.001***  -0.001*** 
    (-7.12)  (-3.57) 
Board size    -0.003***  -0.002*** 
    (-9.18)  (-5.98) 
Year fixed effects    Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects    Yes  Yes 
       
Adjusted R-square       0.4120   0.5018 
 
 47 
 
TABLE 8 Alternative approaches to deal with cross-correlation in error terms 
This table reports the results of implementing alternative approaches to deal with cross-correlation in error terms in 
Table 4 Panel A, Table 5 Panel A, and Table 5 Panel B. Panel A presents the results with two-way clustering of the 
standard errors by firm and by year. Panel B presents the results of using the Fama-MacBeth approach; the 
regressions are first estimated for each year and the average coefficients and corresponding t-statistics across the 
years are then computed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Two-way clustering by firm and year 
 
  Table 4 Panel A   Table 5 Panel A   Table 5 Panel B 
 PIN Spread  Forecast Analyst  PIN Spread 
        Frequency Coverage       
        
Intercept 0.186*** 0.720***  10.008*** 59.287***  0.181*** 0.694*** 
 (16.10) (6.18)  (8.06) (15.24)  (24.46) (6.42) 
Board independence -0.015*** -0.097***  0.854** 1.908***  -0.010** -0.066* 
 (-2.80) (-2.66)  (2.39) (3.59)  (-2.21) (-1.91) 
Forecast frequency       -0.000** -0.001 
       (-2.51) (-0.52) 
Analyst coverage       -0.003*** -0.016*** 
       (-11.77) (-5.03) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
         
Adjusted R-square 0.2432 0.4422   0.2679 0.6287   0.2973 0.4639 
 
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth approach 
 
  Table 4 Panel A   Table 5 Panel A   Table 5 Panel B 
 PIN Spread  Forecast Analyst  PIN Spread 
        Frequency Coverage       
        
Intercept 0.165*** 0.475***  12.175*** 61.769***  0.160*** 0.438*** 
 (13.54) (6.48)  (8.68) (19.83)  (15.38) (7.57) 
Board independence -0.012** -0.091***  0.848*** 1.321***  -0.007* -0.057** 
 (-2.69) (-4.09)  (4.01) (3.80)  (-2.15) (-2.68) 
Forecast frequency       -0.001** -0.008*** 
       (-3.06) (-3.40) 
Analyst coverage       -0.003*** -0.015*** 
       (-14.24) (-5.88) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
         
Adjusted R-square 0.2101 0.3825   0.0765 0.5760   0.2608 0.3997 
 
 
 
